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THE IMPLICATIONS OF CANADIAN 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR 
U.S. BUSINESS IN CANADA 
Peter Yoerg 
Antitrust policy is an integral but under-
appreciated factor in the Canadian debate over 
free trade. Some Canadians have argued that 
big business has hurt innovation, investment, 
and thus Canada's standing in the world mar-
ket. Other Canadians see most Canadian busi-
nesses as too small and vulnerable to destruc-
tion by foreign competition. The resolution of 
these issues will determine the degree of objec-
tivity the Canadian government provides in reg-
ulating industry structure and upholding the 
very principle of the free market. 
The voices of the debate on corporate con-
centration are filled with certainty, and some-
times virulence. Diane Francis, editor of 
Canada's Financial Post, lists her biggest ene-
mies as welfare cheats, money launderers, 
socialists, and "the dragons of corporate con-
centration." (Posner, p. 126) From a more aca-
demic perspective, Professor Michael E. Porter 
of the Harvard Business School, in a report to 
Canada's Business Council on National Issues, 
cites "weak rivalry in the domestic market" as 
having seriously hindered Canada's interna-
tional competitive success. (Porter, pp. 55-56) 
17 
On the other side of the issue, Rita 
Dionne-Marsolais of Quebec states that Canada 
must increase merger activity and cooperation 
among firms in order to secure its future pros-
perity. According to Dionne-Marsalais, "As com-
petitors come from all over the world, our busi-
nesses need to work closer together, pool their 
resources to meet external markets, and form 
alliances to win against new and frequently lit-
tle known, although powerful, competitors." 
(Dionne-Marsolais, p. 1) 
While this political debate rages on, 
Canada's Bureau of Competition Policy asserts 
that its position on antitrust affairs is objective 
and based on sound theories of economics. 
However, the Competition Act of Canada and 
the guidelines established by the bureau for 
enforcement of the act open bureau policy to 
ideological biases that may unfairly impede U.S. 
business in Canada. Current bureau policy has 
largely avoided political contamination of pol-
icy. However, the articles in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (hereafter referred to as 
NAFTA) governing antitrust coordination 
between Canada and the U.S. lack the power to 
prevent questionable antitrust policy in the 
future and thus demand a critical look at the 
objectivity of Canada's Competition Act. 
Modem Industrial Organization 
Theory: A Primer 
An examination of antitrust enforcement 
is useless without at least a basic understanding 
of the theory that governs policy. There are cer-
tain predominant theories of industrial organi-
zation which frame policy debate in Canada. 
Most center around the Structure-Conduct-
Performance model (hereafter referred to as the 
SCP model), which links the structure of an 
industry to the conduct and performance of its 
individual firms. The SCP model dictates that 
the level of competition in an industry will deter-
mine firm conduct and performance. However, 
a competing model - called the reverse-SCP 
model -contends that the performance of 
firms dictates the structure of the industry. 
One might ask, why is there so much con-
cern over finding a correct model of industrial 
organization? The answer is that the two mod-
els reach diametrically opposing conclusions 
about the proper degree of government inter-
vention in the business practices of an industry. 
The SCP model concludes that a high level of 
competition prevents firms from gaining con-
trol over a market and using that control to 
charge unfair prices, to bully competitors out of 
the market, or to incur excessive costs and inef-
ficiencies of production. Thus, the government 
has a duty to prevent a company or group of 
companies from cornering a market. Calvin S. 
Goldman, the former director of Canada's 
Bureau of Competition Policy, has best expressed 
the conclusions of SCP theory: "In short, when 
competition is protected, a propelling mecha-
nism of the economy is protected." (Goldman, 
p. 124) On the other hand, the reverse-SCP 
model assumes a Darwinistic scheme, where 
companies earn their control over a market 
through superior efficiency. Government inter-
vention in this process would result in an inef-
ficient industry. (Perrakis, pp. 4-5) 
The Application of Theory to the 
Canadian Model 
The reverse-SCP model has intriguing 
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implications for the Canadian market. The pre-
dominance of large firms in Canada has been 
attributed to their superior efficiency; that is, 
it costs less for a certain product to be made in 
bulk by a few firms than to have many small 
firms making the same product. (Green, p. 104) 
Thus, the minimum efficient size (MES) of 
firms must be taken into account by policy 
makers. In addition, the assessment of MES in 
Canada must also consider the role of foreign 
competition. Many Canadian industries which 
prospered before the reduction in trade barri-
ers have seen their markets conquered by larg-
er and more efficient foreign companies. 
Foreign competition often heightens MES, as 
firms must restructure to remain competitive 
in the world market. 
The international scope of the Canadian 
market also plays a role in preventing collusion 
among firms. Normally, a government whose 
policies are aimed at encouraging the existence 
of competitive markets should insist on a large 
number of firms in each industry, because the 
presence of only a few firms presents a greater 
opportunity for firms to collude over the prices 
of their goods. The presence of foreign com-
petitors unlikely to honor such agreements 
should then result in a more lenient govern-
ment policy towards domestic mergers. 
(Perrakis, p. 51) 
Still, the presence of foreign competition 
in Canada is not great enough to guarantee a 
competitive marketplace. The degree of com-
petitiveness is significantly higher in the U.S. 
than in Canada, even taking into account the 
influence of imports. Specifically, the United 
States sees 77 percent of its G.D.P. contributed 
by competitive industry, in contrast to Canada's 
44 percent. The presence of provincial trade bar-
riers (which diminish outside competition) has 
also led to market concentration, especially in 
the media and service industries (Perrakis, p. 49) 
There is also an essential difference 
between the United States and Canada in regard 
to the politics of antitrust policy. Namely, a 
more "liberal" government in the United States1 
usually engages in stricter antitrust enforce-
ment, due to its characteristic suspicion of "big 
1
"Liberal" here does not refer to classical liberalism, but 
rather liberalism in the sense that the Democratic Party is 
more liberal than the Republican party. 
business." In contrast, the Liberal Party in 
Canada is less concerned with the size of com-
panies, at least when those large companies pro-
vide a degree of protection from foreign domi-
nation of domestic markets. Thus, Canada's 
current Liberal government is likely to push for 
more creative interpretations of exemptions to 
the Competition Act. 
In addition, the assessment of a country's 
ability to compete in a free-trade market can be 
highly political. One need look no further than 
the heated NAFTA debate in the United States. 
Protectionists believe that small domestic busi-
nesses are unlikely to survive, given the "advan-
tages" of foreign competitors. However, some of 
the "advantages" a foreign firm enjoys may be 
temporary. For example, the exchange rate could 
strengthen the c~rrency of the foreign firm's 
country, thus making the foreign firm's goods 
more expensive in Canada. Such technical eco-
nomic considerations are often downplayed in 
assessing the imp~ct of a free-trade market. 
It is important to keep in mind the influ-
ence of the reverse-SCP model in Canada, in 
order to better understand the idiosyncracies of 
Canada's competition law and the attitude of the 
government towards its enforcement. 
An Overview of Bureau Enforcement 
Canada's antitrust enforcement is carried 
out primarily under the Competition Act of 
1986. The Competition Act demands that fac-
tors other than simple market concentration 
should be taken into account in policing merg-
ers. In addition to the usual concerns of con-
sumer welfare and competitive opportunities, 
the Bureau of Competition Policy is directed to 
focus its policy towards the "efficiency and 
adaptability" of the Canadian economy, as well 
as towards the expansion of Canadian partici-
pation in world markets. 
To insure objectivity, the bureau has 
strived to maintain its political independence, 
as well as to enforce antitrust policy on a pure-
ly national scale. (Goldman, p. 124) A national 
basis for enforcement has helped Canada avoid 
the potential havoc that inferior and outdated 
state antitrust laws could play on merger activ-
ity in the United States. 
The institutional structure of enforcement 
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balances expertise with objectivity. Cases are 
tried before the Competition Tribunal, com-
posed of four judges and up to eight non-judi-
cial members. Before the passage of the 
Competition Act, only judges decided antitrust 
cases; prosecutors were bound by the strict 
criminal rules for evidence and guilt, as well as 
by economic illiteracy on the part of some 
judges. The tribunal allows for consideration of 
economic theories while retaining judges to 
insure due process. (Goldman, pp. 124-25) 
Confusion is generated by the amalgam of 
criminal and civil penalties available under the 
Competition Act. First, no private party can sue 
over a company's merger or joint venture. The 
government can use civil prosecution in fight-
ing "abuse of dominance" - when a company 
uses its market power to manipulate prices and 
shut out competitors. However, price collusion 
per se is still a criminal offense, and so very 
strict rules of evidence must be used. This 
makes price collusion prosecution very difficult, 
since a formal agreement of collusion must be 
produced in order to prove the parties guilty. 
Vertical restraint (constricting competition 
among retailers of the product) and price dis-
crimination (charging different prices for the 
same product) can be punished through either 
criminal or civil penalties. 
The bureau has almost ignored vertical 
mergers,Z except in regulated industries, where 
profit-shielding to circumvent rate regulation 
can be a problem. Conglomerate mergers3 do 
not concern policy officials, because the bureau 
feels this type of merger is undertaken most 
often by a firm trying to spread its risks over a 
diversity of markets, rather than trying to cor-
ner a specific market. 
The bureau's interpretations of the 
Competition Act have led to a liberalization of 
policy in recent years. For example, in deter-
mining whether it should block a company's 
proposed merger, the bureau considers that 
company's ability to handle foreign competition 
not only in Canada but abroad. The bureau has 
2An example of a vertical merger would be the takeover 
of a raw material supply company by a manufacturer who 
purchases his materials from that company. 
3A conglomerate merger is one between two companies 
whose product markets are totally different; thus, the merg-
er could not concentrate market power in a specific industry. 
also taken a lenient approach to takeovers 
involving a failing firm. Further, one of the jus-
tifications the bureau has made for its lenient 
policies has been the lowering of tariffs. With 
lower tariffs, the bureau has argued, outside 
firms face less of a barrier to entering a market. 
The most consistent allowance for merg-
ers, however, has been an efficiency exemption. 
As shown above, the Competition Act specifi-
cally allows for the "efficiency and adaptability" 
of Canada's economy to be taken into account 
when approval of a merger is pending before the 
bureau. Under Director George Addy, the 
bureau has allowed MES considerations to com-
pensate for competitive losses if the merging 
companies can demonstrate cost efficiency as a 
reason for merging. Similarly, specialization 
agreements are allowed, in which firms may 
agree to stop producing the same product 
simultaneously if there are lower costs associ-
ated with one-firm production of the item. 
A central fault in the efficiency exemption 
is the relative inaccuracy of efficiency predic-
tions. After all, it is the company which pro-
duces the figures of projected cost savings. 
More questionable is the predictability of export 
gains available through a merger. Interest and 
exchange rate projections can be distorted by 
merging companies eager to avoid government 
intervention. 
While efficiency exemptions prove vul-
nerable under uncertain international trade 
conditions, the bureau's aversion to formal lit-
igation has acted to accommodate the 
dynamism of international trade. Litigation 
usually involves the choosing of one extreme, 
merger or no merger, as ex-Director Goldman 
points out, instead of an economically superi-
or alternative, such as allowing a more limited 
merger. For example, the bureau most often 
intervenes in mergers through advance rulings, 
extensive advisory work, or a three-year moni-
toring process of a completed merger. In addi-
tion to the disadvantages of litigation detailed 
above, sensitive business issues would have to 
be divulged in an open court- a threat which 
could prevent many beneficial mergers. 
(Goldman, p. 127) 
Since 1986, the bureau has restructured, 
rather than simply prohibited, two mergers to 
comply with competition policy. The first was a 
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partial acquisition of the InterBake Food 
Division of Weston Foods by Nabisco Brands 
Ltd. The second acquisition was by Nestle 
Enterprises Ltd., which purchased certain cof-
fee assets of Nabisco Brands Ltd. In both 
instances, the permitted merger was less exten-
sive than that planned by the companies 
involved, but limited mergers were negotiated 
to the satisfaction of all parties. (Wetston, p. 917) 
The Competition Act: Potential 
Dangers for Small Firms 
In its efforts to incorporate flexibility into 
antitrust law, Canada has left open the poten-
tial for abuse of the law. Much interpretive 
power of the Competition Act lies in one gov-
ernment bureau, the Bureau of Competition 
Policy, rather than in the courts. This Canadian 
aversion to litigation does have its advantages, 
such as those detailed above. However, private 
citizens have their hands tied because the 
opportunities to sue privately against anti com-
petitive acts are so limited. (Goldman, p. 127) 
Investment Canada 
Investment Canada is an institution inde-
pendent of the Bureau of Competition Policy, 
with its own merger-blocking powers. Its role in 
protecting Canadian business must also be con-
sidered as a potential danger to U.S. firms. This 
organization is chiefly responsible for control-
ling the degree of foreign ownership in Canada. 
While it has intervened less frequently in recent 
years, it still has the power to block mergers, 
even in contradiction with bureau policy. Thus, 
political bias in antitrust policy can still be read-
ily effected by Investment Canada, despite the 
balance and objectivity achievable through the 
Competition Tribunal. (Goldman, p. 125) 
Concern about Investment Canada should 
not excite angst for U.S. business, though. 
Investment Canada's role is to block foreign 
business efforts in Canada that the bureau feels 
would result in excessive foreign concentration 
in a market. The political climate in Canada has 
recently shifted away from unreasonable con-
cerns about foreign domination. Thus, the far 
more important problem for U.S. business try-
ing to enter the Canadian market is the effort 
of private firms, through price fixing or other 
anticompetitive schemes, to keep U.S. products 
out of the Canadian market. (Goldman, p. 126) 
"Adaptability" and "Minimum 
Efficient Size": A Pandora's Box of 
Ambiguity 
The Bureau of Competition Policy claims 
to supersede the largely political concerns of 
Investment Canada with sound economic the-
ory. However, the selective identification of fac-
tors which would qualify as efficiency exemp-
tions under the Competition Act demonstrates 
a political bias, albeit a slight one, in the 
bureau's enforcement of antitrust policy. For 
example, an increase in the trade deficit4 would 
technically lead to an "efficiency" in the econ-
omy (with lower prices resulting from increased 
competition), as well as an increase in con-
sumer power (as choice of products and com-
petition among products for market share 
increases). Both macroeconomic and consumer 
power gains are mentioned explicitly in the 
Competition Act as proper exemptions to 
antitrust action. However, it is doubtful that the 
"efficiency gains" of an increasing U.S. share in 
the Canadian market would be taken into con-
sideration if such a gain was accomplished by a 
U.S. company's acquisition of a Canadian firm. 
Such a consideration would not be politically 
wise. It is therefore unlikely that this acquisi-
tion would avoid bureau action on the basis of 
such an efficiency. 
There may also be too much reliance on 
MES (minimum efficient size of a firm) consid-
erations in the bureau's determination of accept-
able size in Canadian businesses. The bureau's 
almost automatic acceptance of the takeovers of 
failing firms has an implicit MES justification 
- namely, that the merger of the fail ing firm 
with another would create combined, and thus 
more efficient, production. Takeovers involving 
a failing firm are rarely challenged, even though 
an upstart or smaller firm might have taken over 
the demand in a more efficient manner, had not 
the failing firm been saved by bureau action. 
Perhaps a more proper name for MES is MIS -
4A trade deficit increase would be effected through the 
successful integration of U.S. products in Canadian markets. 
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minimum inefficient size. MIS would be the size 
the firm must maintain or build to in order to 
keep itself alive, rather than to be efficient. The 
company may have to become bigger in order 
to maintain market power and control prices, if 
its costs are too high (due to inefficiency) to 
meet a free-market price. The bureau's direc-
tives and recent rulings show a definite tenden-
cy to encourage survival more than efficiency in 
Canadian businesses. 
One aim of the Competition Act, accord-
ing to the letter of the act, is to increase the 
"efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian 
economy." The inclusion of the term "adapt-
ability" opens up a Pandora's box of question-
able long-term exemptions from antitrust 
action. Granted, the term "adaptability" might 
also embrace an enhanced policy of enforce-
ment, if the bureau thought that the Canadian 
economy would best adapt to the world market 
through the downsizing of firms to spur effi-
ciency, innovation, and the development of 
niche markets.5 However, in Canada this ver-
sion of "adaptability" has a negative connota-
tion. Specifically, the Mulroney government 
argued that free trade with the United States 
was a necessary vehicle for Canadian business 
to adapt to a world economy. However, Canada 
saw the deconcentration of its market result in 
little innovation or development of niche mar-
kets for Canadian goods and services. 
It is perhaps unlikely that the positive 
effects of free trade could ever outweigh the 
adaptive problems faced by a country's market 
in the short run. Canada's desire for quick pos-
itive results was due to a concern for political 
and not economic realities. With a Liberal gov-
ernment now in power in Canada, the "adapt-
ability" criterion is more likely to be used to 
concede an anticompetitive environment. For 
example, the bureau could allow a merger 
which increases market share of two merging 
businesses to an anti competitive level, if those 
businesses could convince the bureau that the 
merger in question would allow them to "adapt" 
to foreign advances on their market which 
would otherwise cause them to downsize or fail. 
In the opinion of this author, neither MES 
5This concept may look familiar to United States citi-
zens witnessing such actions by giants like IBM. 
nor "adaptability" considerations have been 
abused to the extent pictured above. However, 
the possibility of such abuse represents a poten-
tial problem in the Competition Act. Both MES 
and adaptability are valuable criteria in ascer-
taining the economic effects of a merger or 
pricing policy. However, their use is most effec-
tive and fair when limited and specific. 
Another danger of conditional antitrust 
enforcement concerns tariffs. The bureau often 
takes a lowering of tariffs into account in calcu-
lating the probability of collusion in a concen-
trated market. For example, a concentrated 
industry may not be the target of bureau action 
if a tariff on its market product has been recent-
ly reduced or eliminated. The thinking behind 
such a justification is that foreign competitors 
are less likely to collude with the current oligop-
oly. Such thinking ignores the logical conse-
quence that the introduction of foreign compe-
tition would be a probable inducement for the 
oligopoly to collude in the interest of shutting 
out the foreign competitor(s). It would collude 
through typical abuses of market power such as 
predatory pricing or retail price maintenance.6 
Canada also allows the participation in 
world markets to be considered. That is, a merg-
er might be allowed in Canada if the business-
es in question were projecting an expansion of 
Canadian participation into world markets, 
even if Canadian business' standing in the 
domestic market was not improved. (Goldman, 
p. 126) It is unclear whether the products 
enhancing Canada's hold on the world market 
must be made in Canada. 
The problems inherent in Canada's amal-
gam of civil and criminal antitrust codes has 
already been discussed. However, the bureau's 
strategy to prosecute successfully under these 
codes has been less than successful. In order to 
avoid difficult criminal trials, the bureau often 
prosecutes price discrimination under the civil 
violation of "abuse of dominance." (Perrakis, p. 
289) Unfortunately, the Competition Act does 
not define "abuse of dominance" in specific 
terms, leaving open the same dangers of ambi-
6Predatory pricing occurs when a producer lowers his 
prices below cost in order to force his competitors to lower 
their prices also below cost, thus bankrupting the com-
petitors. Retail price maintenance refers to the forced main-
tenance of a single price among retailers by the producer. 
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guity found in the exemption clauses in the 
merger section of the act. 
The "Adaptability" Criterion and the 
Limited Tariff Model 
One more example will demonstrate the 
potential danger of a long-term exemption to 
antitrust law in the name of "adaptability." 
Namely, the contrast between tariff barriers and 
private collusion will be established in order to 
highlight the faulty logic of allowing private 
collusion to advance the "adaptability" of an 
economy. 
Tariff barriers function in a similar way to 
private collusion- they both keep out com-
petition. That is, a group of Canadian businesses 
colluding to keep U.S. business out of its mar-
ket is trying to accomplish the same thing as a 
government which erects a tariff barrier against 
foreign goods. A recent trend in economic 
thought is the acceptance of a limited tariff to 
allow a domestic firm time to prepare for for-
eign competition. An example in the United 
States would be the tariff the U.S. once placed 
on motorcycles of over 1000 cc displacement. 
This was done in order to allow Harley-
Davidson (which only manufactured motorcy-
cles over 1000 cc) a chance to make its plant 
sufficiently efficient and technologically 
advanced to compete successfully with foreign 
motorcycle manufacturers. This limited tariff 
is still largely regarded as a successful effort at 
adapting U.S. industry to foreign competition. 
It is tempting to make a parallel between 
a government effort at limited tariff assignment 
and a private business effort of collusion to shut 
out foreign competition. Why can't the bureau 
selectively allow anti competitive practices if the 
Canadian businesses in question simply want 
an opportunity to adapt to the foreign threat? 
After all, they just need a few years to invest 
their profits into capital improvements, instead 
of drastically reducing their profit margin try-
ing to meet the competitors' prices. 
Such logic is highly fallible. The bureau's 
permission to collude would grant market con-
centration to a number of firms, not just one 
(in the most common case of an oligopoly). 
Firms with a serious interest in capital invest-
ment could not be targeted in the manner that 
a limited tariff makes possible. 
The effects of antitrust policy on econom-
ic health are controversial enough that the 
employment of antitrust policy outside of its 
traditional objectives really makes little sense. 
This knowledge has led U.S. antitrust authori-
ties to avoid adopting Canadian-style antitrust 
policy. Unfortunately, false parallels such as that 
seen between the theories of conditional 
antitrust enforcement and limited tariffs may 
encourage a destructively passive enforcement 
of antitrust policy. 
Differences Between U.S. and 
Canadian Price Discrimination Law 
In Canada, price discrimination7 is not 
considered an offense unless it has become a 
standard practice of the firm. The following 
goals can justify "occasional" price discrimina-
tion: gaining a new buyer, entering another 
market, or participating in a store 's promo-
tional clearance or anniversary sale. In contrast, 
price discrimination in the United States is gen-
erally prohibited. (Goldman and Bodrug, p. 7) 
Canada's Director of Competition Policy 
does not have to prove intent on the part of the 
seller to lessen competition in order to gain a 
price discrimination conviction. Competitive 
injury (in this case, the use of price discrimi-
nation to harm or destroy competition) does 
not have to be proven, either; but the decision 
to prosecute a price discriminator will take into 
account the degree that such discrimination 
resulted in, or would result in, a lessening of 
competition. Also, in the United States, a sale 
to at least two buyers, reflecting the price dis-
crimination, is needed. (Goldman and Bodrug, 
p. 10) In Canada, even if the higher-price pur-
chaser refuses to pay, the law still considers this 
price discrimination. And buyers are not the 
only party who can sue or lodge a complaint 
with the Director; competitors of the seller or 
even customers of the buyers may also sue or 
complain. (Goldman and Bodrug, p. 10) 
The Robinson-Patman Act, the major 
price discrimination law of the United States, 
does not allow sellers to charge different prices 
When a company charges different prices to consumers 
based on their ability to pay, price discrimination has 
occurred. 
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at different levels of the distribution chain 
according to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck. (Goldman and 
Bodrug, p. 10) For example, a seller could not 
charge a wholesaler a different price than that 
it offered to a retailer. In Canada, such price dif-
ferences are prohibited only when the whole-
saler and retailer compete against each other. 
For example, a warehouse club which caters 
mostly to consumers would be considered a 
competitor with retailers. 
A few additional examples will be used to 
delineate the differences in Canadian and U.S. 
antitrust law and to further demonstrate a sig-
nificant incompatibility between the antitrust 
laws of both countries. In the United States, 
sellers are allowed to justify price differences if 
it costs the seller more to produce the good for 
one buyer than for another. In Canada, such an 
allowance is not permitted. However, a quanti-
ty discount is allowed, so any cost savings due 
to higher quantities can be passed on to the 
buyer. (Goldman and Bodrug, p. 11) 
In regard to the "availability" of discounts, 
United States law requires that a price offer 
must be disclosed to all competing buyers. In 
Canada, on the other hand, a negotiated price, 
as detailed before, does not have to be disclosed, 
but rather only offered to all competing buyers. 
(Goldman and Bodrug, p. 11) 
While the United States limits violations to 
those that occur within the U.S., Canadian law 
considers two sales anywhere in the world to 
competing buyers to fall within the jurisdiction 
of price discrimination law. Also, the permitted 
price difference that is caused by consumer pref-
erence of one brand name over another is small-
er in the U.S. than in Canada. 8 As was seen 
before, this difference in consumer preference 
can occur because of differences in trademarks 
or labelling. (Goldman and Bodrug, p. 12) 
Finally, Canadian law does not hold a 
buyer liable just for knowingly accepting a dis-
criminatory price, while under the Robinson-
Patman Act in the U.S. the buyer would be 
liable. However, Canadian price discrimination 
8Even though a consumer may not choose one brand 
name over another because of a quality difference between 
the two, the selection process is similar to making a deci-
sion between brands of differing quality. Thus the difference 
between the two brands is classified as a "quality" difference. 
law is stricter in that it covers "articles," not 
only the "commodities" of Robinson-Patman. 
Articles can include both real property (com-
modities) as well as personal or intangible 
property (such as energy). (Goldman and 
Bodrug, p. 12) 
Price Discrimination Law and Cross-
Border Transactions 
As has just been pointed out, the types of 
justifications for price discrimination are dif-
ferent in Canada and the United States; there-
fore, companies who wish to adopt a universal 
selling strategy in North America have to con-
sider each country's laws. However, the limits 
of each country's jurisdiction restricts in some 
ways full compliance with both Canadian and 
United States law. For example, the jurisdiction 
of the Robinson-Patman Act is limited to sales 
within the United States. Selling at two differ-
ent prices, one price to an American buyer and 
the other price to a Canadian buyer, would not 
be an offense under U.S. law. However, Canadian 
law would consider the previous scenario an 
offense. Still, the bureau has stated that its con-
cern is the market within Canada, and therefore 
it is unlikely to prosecute the offense. Even so, 
this attitude may change as transborder mar-
kets develop into a more interdependent struc-
ture. (Goldman and Bodrug, p. 13) 
The bureau's recent enforcement guide-
lines concerning sales to subsidiaries has a sin-
gular importance to U.S. firms. The firm and 
its subsidiary must work as a "single econom-
ic unit." Additionally, the firm must offer dis-
counts to its subsidiary only in return for serv-
ices rendered by that subsidiary. If these two 
conditions are not met, the U.S. company must 
sell goods to its subsidiary at the same price it 
sells to outside Canadian buyers. If, on the 
other hand, it sells the same good directly to 
buyers and also indirectly through a subsidiary, 
direct sales must include the same price con-
cessions made by the subsidiary to buyers. 
(Goldman and Bodrug, pp. 13-14) 
Antitrust Provisions of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
The importance of NAFTA lies not only in 
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fostering free trade among Mexico, Canada, and 
the United States, but also in establishing the 
terms of trade that will determine the fairness 
and success of the treaty. While the news media 
has emphasized the environmental and labor 
side agreements to the treaty, provisions for 
antitrust cooperation have also been established 
in NAFTA. The strength or weakness of these 
provisions will play a pivotal role in determining 
U.S. influence over Canadian antitrust policy. 
One of the five main objectives listed in 
the first chapter of NAFTA is the promotion of 
"conditions of fair competition" in North 
America. (Paul et al., p. 3) However, there are 
few concrete mechanisms of cooperation in 
antitrust affairs laid out in NAFTA, such as 
those found in the antitrust cooperation agree-
ment signed in September of 1991 between the 
U.S. and the European Economic Community. 
The lack of formal mechanisms to coordinate 
antitrust policy is perhaps due to the low pri-
ority placed on competition issues by NAFTA 
negotiators. (Paul et al., p. 73) 
NAFTA does set the stage for increased 
antitrust cooperation, however, through its 
establishment of a trilateral Working Group on 
Trade and Competition to make recommenda-
tions for action within five years. And the inclu-
sion of a competition chapter in NAFTA sounds, 
according to Paul, "an important tone: 
antitrust concerns will play a major- and 
unappreciated- role in determining how suc-
cessful NAFTA will be in achieving a seamless 
North American market." (Paul et al., p. 75) 
Antitrust cooperation is detailed in NAFTA 
to include the exchange of information and 
mutual assistance between enforcement agen-
cies, as well as the notification of antitrust 
action to each country's agency. However, the 
NAFTA dispute settlement provisions specifi-
cally exempt issues of competition policy or 
enforcement, so that no independent panel 
review or consultation with other governments 
is guaranteed. (Paul et al., p. 74) 
Despite NAFTA's impotence in establish-
ing uniform antitrust regulation, it does estab-
lish specific rules concerning state enterprises 
and monopolies. If, for example, a state enter-
prise has the power to grant licenses, approve 
transactions, or charge fees, then it must not 
do so in a way which discriminates in favor of 
domestic companies. Additionally, a state enter-
prise must offer the same price for its goods or 
services to foreign and domestic buyers. (Paul 
et al., p. 74) Thus, American firms have a right 
to the same prices as Canadian firms in such 
areas as hydroelectric energy, and may chal-
lenge current price breaks offered to some 
Canadian firms in this area. 
Government-declared monopolies must 
follow the same rules, but they face three addi-
tional restraints. First, the price and availabil-
ity of the good or service must be "in accor-
dance with commercial considerations." (Paul 
et al., p. 75) Second, price discrimination is ille-
gal. Third, a monopoly cannot use its advan-
tages to concentrate non-monopoly markets 
through price discrimination, cross-subsidiza-
tion (using profits from its monopoly business 
to subsidize strategic predatory pricing), or any 
predatory conduct. In contrast to the enforce-
ment guidelines for private industry, state 
enterprises and monopolies are not held exempt 
from the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions. 
(Paul et al., p. 75) Finally, NAFTA specifically 
excludes intellectual property rights (such as 
patents or copyrights) from the definition of 
"monopoly," despite the similar market power 
derived from both monopolies and patents. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Canadian antitrust enforce-
ment utilizes a combination of economic the-
ory and specific political objectives in enforc-
ing antitrust law. The main justifications for 
stifling competition are efficiency gains and 
international competitiveness. Due to the vague 
wording of Canada's Competition Act, the door 
is open for excessively liberal allowance of 
mergers in the name of "adaptability" and "effi-
ciency" in an economy, even in the face of ver-
bal promises by the bureau to crack down on 
big business. In fact, the misuse of the exemp-
tions laid out in the Competition Act could 
result in a hindrance to Canada's adjustment to 
free trade. It is through conditional enforce-
ment of antitrust policy that Canada remains 
more liberal than the United States in the field 
of antitrust. Finally, it is conditional enforce-
ment that continues to pose a danger to U.S. 
business in Canada. 
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